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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXVII May, 1939 Number 4
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION UPON
FORECLOSURE*
By A. 0. STANLEY, JR.t
An economic depression, world wide in its scope and
affecting all nations and peoples, cannot be viewed as anything
less than catastrophic. This financial and economic collapse has
resulted in the destruction of markets for all property, real and
personal alike, and has impoverished many hitherto reposing in
supposed financial security; it has caused the loss of the savings
of a lifetime for hundreds of thousands of individuals; and it
has imperiled and in many instances destroyed long established
business enterprises operated under conservative and efficient
management.
In a time of such grave financial distress a new element
obtrudes itself, creating an embarrassing situation, not so much
in the legalistic as from the practical aspect. While no system
of jurisprudence has viewed with greater abhorrence, the
*No attempt is made in this treatise to enter into a dissertation
on the effect, or the constitutionality of the various statutes enacted by
state legislatures providing for mortgage moratoria. The principles
herein discussed relate solely to the inherent power of equity, aside
from statute, to intervene in times of economic depression and stay
mortgage foreclosure because of the resultant hardships attending such
proceedings.
A majority of the reported cases pertinent to this subject deal
primarily with the judicial sale of real estate under foreclosure of
mortgages or deeds of trust, but it is submitted that the same general
principles of law are applicable to the foreclosure of corporate mort-
gages and to the sale of securities, or other property pledged or
hypothecated as security for loans. It was held in Suring State Bank v.
Giese (1933), 210 Wis. 489, 493, 246 N. W. 556, 557, that a court should
ordinarily exercise the same power in cases of farm mortgages as in
cases of corporate foreclosures, and per contra, then, the court should
apply the same principles of law in the foreclosure of corporate mort-
gages as is applicable to the foreclosure and sale of farm lands.
fLL.B., Columbus University of Washington, D. C.; member of
Kentucky and District of Columbia bars, and admitted to practice
before the Interstate Commerce Commission; member of the Legal
Staff of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
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abrogation, direct or indirect, of contractual responsibility, nor
has more strenuously resisted interference with the natural
intendment of contract than has English and American law,
still such an unprecedented situation as has recently confronted
us has caused the law to seek to ameliorate obligations ordinarily
unhesitatingly enforced, but which under the existing conditions
result undeniably in uncontemplated disaster, if not destruction.
Throughout the land American tribunals have strained to the
utmost to alleviate inequitable oppression resulting from the
effect of bond and mortgage default. Courts have in many
instances sought to circumscribe the effect of foreclosure, in
recognition of this change which has rendered security insecure,
and transformed prosperity into indigence.1
Such a situation may necessitate new applications of legal
and equitable rules and concepts requiring the courts to render
their judgments with more fidelity to economic facts, with more
general utility, and in partial or complete disregard of rules
conceived in the past, upon the basis of totally different postu-
lates and world conditions.2
In Wisconsin the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat
revolutionary stand, but at the same time unassailable in logic
and justice. Judge Wickham, in Suring State Bank v. Giese3
said: "The Court may, upon application for the confirmation
of a sale, * * * conduct a hearing, establish the value of the
property, and as a condition to confirmation, require that the
fair value of the property be credited upon the foreclosure judg-
ment. * * * If the fair value as found by the court, when applied
to the mortgaged debt, discharges it, there will be no occasion for
the entering of a deficiency judgment. In case this procedure
is adopted by the court, the option should be given to the plain-
tiff to accept or reject it. In the event of its rejection, the resale
1 Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp. (1933), 147 Misc.
(N. Y.) 374, 265 N. Y. S. 115; Fifth Ave. Bk. of New York v. Compson
(1933), 113 N. J. Eq. 152, 166 Atl. 86; Security Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Grande (1928), 102 N. J. Eq. 320, 140 Atl. 580; Teachers Retirement
Assn. v. Pirie (1935), 150 Ore. 435, 46 P. (2d) 105; Cashin v. Alamac
Hotel (1925), 98 N. J. Eq. 432, 131 At. 117; Davis v. Flagg (1882), 35
N. J. Eq. 491.
2Fifth Ave. Bk. of New York v. Compson (1933), 113 N. 3. Eq. 152,
166 Atl. 86.
1210 Wis. 489, 493, 246 N. W. 556, 558 (1933).
EFFECT OF DEPRESSION ON FORECLOSURE 367
of the property should be ordered." Other courts have followed
the Giese case.4
The effect of the doctrine in the Giese case has, however,
been limited to the extent that before the mortgagor can effect
a delay in the confirmation of a foreclosure sale until a fair
value of the premises is credited on a deficiency he must first
affirmatively show, (1) sale at an unconscionable figure; (2) at
a nominal bid plus the absence of competitive bidding due to
some fact beyond his control, and facts sufficient to invoke
equitable relief; (3) the existence of an emergency because of
which he was unable to protect himself by refinancing or other-
wise; and (4) his own inability, through lack of financial re-
sources or otherwise, to protect himself at the sale.5
We therefore approach the more recent suits for foreclosure
of mortgages with an enlarged conception of the duty imposed
upon a court to see that justice is done to all interested parties;
and we find that equity in particular has exercised a somewhat
dictatorial supervision in such cases and in many instances
imposed heretofore unthought of conditions. 6
Courts which have a true conception of the philosophy of
equity jurisprudence constantly reiterate the fact that equity
meets all conditions; that human ingenuity and human affairs
cannot create a condition which the long arm of equity cannot
reach, if an injustice or wrong would otherwise result. Equity's
modes of relief are not fixed and rigid; it can mold its remedies
to meet the conditions with which it has to deal. 7 "Let the hard-
ship be strong enough," said Justice Cardozo, "and equity will
find a way, though many a formula of inaction may seem to bar
the path." 8  But this is a power which is sparingly used and
certainly not merely to delay a sale on the bare possibility that
' Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp. (1933), 237 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 789, 263 N. Y. S. 359; Graselli Chem. Co. v. Aetna Explo-
sives Co. (1918), 252 Fed. 456.
';Young v. Weber (1934), 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 175 Atl. 273; Fed. Title
& Mtg. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein (1933), 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Atl. 538;
Maher v. Usbe Bldg. & Loan (1934), 116 N. . Eq. 475, 174 Atl. 159.
"Bank of Manhattan v. Ellda (1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.) 374, 265
N. Y. S. 115.
7 Teachers Retirement Fund Assn. v. Pire (1935), 150 Ore. 435, 46
P. (2d) 105; Rice v. Van Vranken (1928), 132 Misc. (N. Y.) 82, 229
N. Y. S. 32; Graselli Chem. Corp. v. Aetna Expl. Co. (1918), 252 Fed.
456; Harrigan v. Gilchrist (1904), 121 Wis. 127, 99 N. W. 909.
A Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp. (1930), 254 N. Y. 1, 13, 171 N. E.
884, 888.
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the property would increase in value at some future date, there-
by making the court an instrument of speculation on future
property values.9 "The fact of depression in value" said Justice
Blatchford, "is no ground in itself for not upholding a sale
under the trust deed, nor is a subsequent rise in value a ground
for setting aside the sale. Those who speculate in real estate on
credit take the risk of depression in value at the time the credit
expires, and those who buy for cash in time of depression are
entitled to the benefit of a subsequent rise in value." 10
The rights of a mortgagee demand the protection of a court
of equity no less than those of the mortgagor; and it is of the
highest interest to the public welfare that no judicial action be
taken which renders a real state mortgage less desirable as an
investment, a result which quite possibly might follow from
indiscriminate restraints in foreclosure proceedings; and equity
should interpose no impediment to obstruct the process of law
in the orderly pursuit by a holder of a mortgage for the lawful
collection of the debt thereby secured, except where it is clearly
necessary for the protection of a countervailing equity."
The interference with regular procedure in foreclosure suits
has been uniformly frowned upon by courts of equity. They
have always been reluctant under any circumstances to grant
injunctive relief from the exercise of a power of sale conferred
by contract, and unless such power is prohibited by law it will
usually be permitted to be exercised in accordance with the agree-
ment of the contracting parties.' 2 Except in cases where a
statute gives an absolute right to an injunction, an injunction,
whether temporary or permanent, cannot as a general rule, be
sought as a matter of right, but its granting or refusal rests in
the sound discretion of the court considering the circumstances
0Fifth Ave. Bank of New York v. Compson (1933), 113 N. J. Eq.
152, 166 Atl. 86; Kotler v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1933),
113 N. J. Eq. 544, 168 Atl. 36; Graselli Chem. Corp. v. Aetna Expl. Co.
(1918), 252 Fed. 456; Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1897), 138
Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465.
20 Smith v. Black (1885), 115 U. S. 308, 318, 6 Sup. Ct. 50, 55.
"Haywood v. Rigsbee (1935), 207 N. C. 695, 178 S. E. 108; Marneil
Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty Corp. (1935), 119 N. 3. Eq. 205, 181
Atl. 882; Fifth Ave. Bank of New York v. Compson (1933), 113 N. J. Eq.
152, 166 Atl. 86; Mellen v. Edwards (1934), 179 Wash. 272, 37 P(2d)
203; United Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Neuman (1933), 113 N. J. Eq. 244,
166 Atl. 537; Free v. Harris (1930), 181 Ark. 644, 27 S. W. (2d) 510;
Cashin v. Alamac Hotel Co. (1925), 98 N. J. Eq. 432, 131 Atl. 117;
Davis v. Flagg (1882), 35 N. J. Eq. 491.
'-High on Injunctions, 4th Ed., Sec. 456.
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and facts of each individual case. This general rule applies with
equal force whether the injunction sought is preventive or
mandatory, and it also applies to the issuance of a restraining
order.' 3
Equity cases are in harmony in holding that, where the
interests of minors or incompetents are not involved, it is a well
settled rule, that, in the absence of fraud or misconduct, an
unpropitious market for the sale of property is no ground for
enjoining a sale, and an injunction to restrain the sale will not
be granted because the property in question is about to be sold
for cash at a forced sale, at a time when in consequence of a
generally prevalent depression and extreme scarcity of money, or
because of the season of the year, the sale will be attended with
great if not irreparable pecuniary loss and sacrifice. Nor will
the court in the absence of extenuating circumstances, refuse
confirmation or set aside a sale attending a lawful and orderly
foreclosure merely because the time was unpropitious for the
sale, or because the sale was made during a period of financial
stringency or economic depression.' 4 And one who has pledged
"Graham v. Currier (1922), 151 Minn. 162, 186 N. W. 229; Wilser
v. Wilser (1916), 132 Minn. 167, 156 N. W. 271; Coppey v. Keady (1914),
S1 Ore. 218, 139 Pac. 108; 32 C. J. 29.
"Anderson v. White, 2 App. (D. C.) 408 (1894); Speers Sand &
Clay Works v. American Trust Co., 52 F. (2d) 831 (1931); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. International Combustion Eng. Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (1933);
In re Yost & Cook, 70 F. (2d) 614 (1934); Equitable Life Assur. Society
v. Vaughn, 82 F. (2d) 978 (1936); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Williamsport
Wire Rope Co. 20 F. Supp. 634 (1937); Denson v. Provident Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 574, 166 So. 33 (1936); Wells v. Lenox, 108 Ark.
366, 159 S. W. 1099 (1912); Horn v. Hull, 169 Ark. 463, 275 S. W. 905
(1925); Union & Planters Bank & Tr. Co. v. Pope, 176 Ark. 1023, 5 S. W.
(2d) 331 (1928); Hawkins v. Wood, 179 Ark. 845, 18 S. W. (2d) 371
(1929); Royal v. McVay, 180 Ark. 973, 23 S. W. (2d) 983 (1930); Free
v. Harris, 181 Ark. 644, 27 S. W. (2d) 510 (1930); Federal Land Bank
of St. Louis v. Floyd, 187 Ark. 616, 61 S. W. (2d) 449 (1933); Bock v.
Losekamp, 179 Calif., 674, 179 Pac. 516 (1919); Jones v. Sierra Ver.
Water Co., 63 Calif. App. 254, 218 Pac. 454 (1923); Brennan v. American
Trust Co., 3 Calif. (2d) 635, 45 P. (2d) 207 (1935); Calif. Securities
Co. v. Grosse, 3 Calif. (2d) 732, 46 P. (2d) 170 (1935); Durst v. Battson,
9 Calif. (2d) 156, 69 P. (2d) 992 (1937); Deprisco v. Rykacewski, 18
Del. Ch. 212, 157 At. 209 (1931); Certain Lands v. Coronado Beach,
128 Fla. 884, 175 So. 775 (1937); Liles v. Bank of Camden County, 151
Ga. 483, 107 S. E. 490 (1921); Stanton v. Mortgage Guaranty Co., 179
Ga. S67, 177 S. E. 556 (1934); Kontz v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bk.
181 Ga. 70, 181 S. E. 764 (1935); Hamilton v. Quimby, 46 Ill. 90 (1867);
Wilson v. Ford, 190 Ill. 614, 60 N. E. 876 (1901); Worden v. Rayburn,
313 Ill. 495, 145 N. E. 101 (1924); Logar v. O'Brien, 339 Ill. 628, 171
N. E. 629 (1930); Clegg v. Christenson, 346 Ill. 314, 178 N. E. 925
(1931); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robim, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4(1935); Illinois Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Conard, 288 Ill. App. 475,
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certain shares of stock with a stock broker as collateral security
for transactions between them, cannot enjoin their sale upon
mere general averments of irreparable injury, or because the
6 N. E. (2d) 232 (1937); Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson,
293 Ill. App. 564, 13 N. E. (2d) 191 (1938); Durham v. Elliott, 180 Ky.
724, 203 S. W. 539 (1918); Smith v. Holowell, 201 Ky. 271, 256 S. W.
408 (1923); Burchfield v. Asher, 222 Ky. 108, 300 S. W. 331 (1927);
Greer v. McAninck, 226 Ky. 644, 11 S. W. (2d) 696 (1928); Kentucky
Joint Land Bank v. Fitzpatrick, 237 Ky. 624, 36 S. W. (2d) 25 (1931);
Rohrs v. McGlasson, 250 Ky. 140, 61 S. W. (2d) 1087 (1933); Louisville
Title Co. v. Ramsey, 258 Ky. 183, 79 S. W. (2d) 693 (1935); Fidelity &
Columbia Tr. Co. v. White Const. Co., 258 Ky. 475, 80 S. W. (2d) 550
(1935); Oglesby v. Prudential Ins. Co., 259 Ky. 620, 82 S. W. (2d) 824
(1935); Henderson v. Henderson, 266 Ky. 319, 98 S. W. (2d) 904 (1936);
Melton v. Tipton, 264 Ky. 196, 94 S. W. (2d) 350 (1936); Stallings v. An-
napolis Say. Inst., 167 Md. 4, 172 Atl. 283 (1934); Clemens v. Union Tr.
Co., 170 Md. 520, 185 Atl. 462 (1936); Northland Pine Co. v. Northland
Insulating Co., 145 Minn. 395, 177 N. W. 635 (1920); Standard Lumber
Mfg. Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Tr. Co., 169 Miss. 120, 152 So. 639
(1934); Lemere v. White, 122 Nebr. 676, 241 N. W. 105 (1932); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Heany, 122 Nebr. 747, 241 N. W. 525 (1932);
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Radke, 122 Nebr. 834, 241 N. W. 752
(1932); Physicians Casualty Assn. v. Brownfield, 133 Nebr. 906, 277
N. W. 599 (1938); Cashin v. Alamac Hotel, 98 N. J. Eq. 432, 131 Atl. 117
(1925); South Jersey Title & Finance Co. v. Ireland, 101 N. J. Eq.
818, 138 Atl. 898 (1927); New Jersey Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Save.
more Realty Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 478, 153 Atl. 480 (1931); Hecht v.
Hoogmoed, 111 N. J. Eq. 331, 162 Atl. 873 (1932); United Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Neuman, 113 N. J. Eq. 244, 166 At. 537 (1933); Kotler v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 544, 168 Atl. 36 (1933);
Marneil Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty Corp., 119 N. J. Eq. 205,
181 Atl. 882 (1935); Karel v. Davis, 122 N. J. Eq. 526, 194 Atl. 545
(1937); Jones v. Page, 26 N. Mex. 440, 194 Pac. 883 (1920); Park v.
Musgrave, 2 Thomp. & Cook, 571 (N. Y., 1874); Loma Holding Corp. v.
Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 655. 265 N. Y. S. 125 (1933);
Kuhn v. Cermac Realty Co., 148 Misc. 324, 265 N. Y. S. 861 (1933);
Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bk. v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271
N. Y. S. 306, (1934); Balick v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164
S. E. 335 (1932); State v. Wilson, 124 Okla. 236, 254 Pac. 968 (1927);
Fiolle v. First Nat. Bank, 173 Okla. 501, 49 P. (2d) 145 (1935); Barnard
v. First Nat. Bk., 176 Okla. 326, 55 P. (2d) 972 (1936); University of
Tulsa v. Moores, 177 Okla. 548, 61 P. (2d) 25 (1936); Armstrong
County Tr. Co. v. Boozer, 216 Pa. 242, 65 Atl. 669 (1907); Lyle v. Arm-
strong, 235 Pa. 224, 83 Atl. 577 (1919); Fenton v. Joki, 294 Pa. 309,
144 Atl. 136 (1928); Plummer v. Wilson, 322 Pa. 118, 185 At. 311
(1936); Ortoleva v. Dijeser, - R. I. -, 191 Atl. 505 (1937); Ex parte
Cooley, 69 S. C. 143, 48 S. E. 92 (1904); In re Wallace, 179 S. C. 480,
184 S. E. 849 (1936); Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Lickness, 63
S. Dak. 618, 262 N. W. 206 (1935); Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737
(1915 Tex. Civ. App.); Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 Utah 586,
268 Pao. 781 (1928); Muller v. Bayle, 21 Grat. 521 (1871, Va.); Muller
v. Stone, 84 Va. 398, 6 S. E. 223 (1888); Williams v. Jones, 165 Va.
398, 182 S. B. 280 (1935); Keyser v. Federal Land Bank of Baltimore,
169 Va. 368, 193 S. E. 489 (1937); Caperton v. Land Craft, 3 W. Va.
640 (1869); Mechan v. Blodgett, 86 Wis. 511, 57 N. W. 291 (1893);
High on Injunctions, 4th Ed., Sec. 454; Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., 4th Ed.,
Vol. 4, Sec. 1738; 19 R. C. L. 617; 41 C. J. 930.
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market for such stocks happens to be unfavorable, in the absence
of any averment of defendant's insolvency. 15
If the-terms of the contract have been followed in making
the sale the interference on the part of a court of equity merely
beeaise the property would likely sell for a great deal more at
some later date would have the effect of impairing the obligations
of contracts and extend the guardianship of the court to those
laboring under no disability to contract for themselves. More-
over, it is quite possible that by such, an interference to prevent
hardship to the debtor, one equally as great might be brought
upon the creditor who might also be the debtor of a third person
and thereby suffer even a greater disaster by failure to collect
the money due him.1'
Unless some additional ground for the injunction could
be shown, other than a greatly depressed market, such as fraud
or unfair dealings, according to Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins.
(',.1 7 "the legal title to the premises passed to the grantee, and
ullness misfortune alone can be made a substantial and
independent source of equity jurisdiction, to be exercised in
behalf of one who does not even offer to do equity (either because
lie is unable or unwilling to do it) the plaintiffs have not a foot
to stand upon in a court of equity. However strongly our
sympathies may be enlisted for the unfortunate victim of hard
times, they cannot furnish a basis for equity jurisdiction, and
such courts cannot and ought not to be made the instruments
of speculation in the future values of property even for the
benefit of the unfortunate. "18
A court of equity will, nevertheless, enjoin the execution of
a power of sale in a mortgage, when it appears that the
mortgagee is proceeding in an improper or oppressive manner or
is perverting the power from its legitimate purpose. And in a
suit for cancellation or redemption of a mortgage, a motion for
a temporary injunction restraining the exercise of a power of
sale may be granted, when it appears that less inconvenience and
':Park v. Musgraves (1874). 2 Thomp. & Cook (N. Y.) 571; High
on Injunctions, 4th Ed., Sec. 454.
"
6 Anderson v. White (1894), 2 App. D. C. 408.
2 138 Mo. 17, 24, 39 S. W. 465, 466 (1897).
11 Followed in Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp.(1933), 147 MIsc. (N. Y.) 655, 265 N. Y. S. 125.
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injustice will thereby be caused to the defendant than would
result to the complainant from refusing the motion.' 9
Perhaps no court is wise enough to declare with absolute
finality that no economic or financial stringency or distress
could warrant equitable restraint of the power of sale in instru-
ments securing debts, but certainly the mere allegation of a
general depression before a sale at an unconscionable purchase
price has not heretofore been deemed adequate to invoke equita-
ble relief.20
No court can fail, however, to take judicial notice of the
financial depression which has existed in recent years. Loans
made a few years ago on the basis of the then going values can-
not possibly be replaced on the basis of present values for it is a
matter of common knowledge that within these few years values
have shrunk enormously. 2 1
Though the court judicially knows that there is a world
wide economic stagnation in all markets and it likewise judicially
knows that loans are not being made through agencies where
formerly they were to be had, and even though there may be no
lending agencies to replace them, there exists nevertheless a line
over which a court of equity should not pass no matter how much
it is tempted, least it trespass upon the jurisdiction reserved for
the legislative branch of the government. 2 2
The Constitution of the United States draws sharp demar-
cation lines between the functions of the co-ordinate branches
of the government. No conscientious court could "for a moment
think of usurping the power of the legislature to declare
a moratorium upon the ground that an emergency exists." If
the legislature is silent it amounts to a command to courts of
equity and law not to interfere with the obligations of contract."'
'SEwing v. Bay Minette Land Co. (1936), 232 Ala. 22, 166 So. 409;
Ballenger v. Price (1929), 219 Ala. 412, 122 So. 628; Caldwell v. Caldwell
(1910), 166 Ala. 406, 52 So. 323; Glover v. Hembree (1884), 82 Ala.
324, 8 So. 251; Warner v. Jacob (1882), 20 Ch. D. (Eng.) 220; Pomeroy's
Equity Jur., 4th Ed. Vol. 4, Sec. 1738; 19 R. C. L. 617.
* Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1932), 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335.
mTeachers Retirement Fund Assn. v. Pirie (1935), 150 Ore. 435,
46 P. (2d) 105; Kuhn v. Cermac Realty Co. (1933), 148 Misc. (N. Y.)
324, 265 N. Y. S. 861.
2 Kuhn v. Cermac Realty Co. (1933), 148 Misc. (N. Y.) 324, 265
N. Y. S. 861.
2Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp. (1933), 147
Misc. (N. Y.) 655, 265 N. Y. S. 125; Kuhn v. Cermac Realty Co. (1933),
148 Misc. (N. Y.) 324, 265 N. Y. S. 861.
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Acting in anticipation, however, of legislative relief a New
York court restrained a sale until reasonable assurance of normal
competitive bidding, upon condition that the mortgagor or
owner not prove recalcitrant in aiding or abiding by whatever
plan a majority of those interested in the res might adopt as
best available. In Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp.24
the Chancellor said: "We are not unmindful of the rights of a
mortgagee, nor are we forgetful of the plight of the owner in
these unbelievable hours of darkness. In ordinary circumstances
no tolerance would be given to a plea delaying the mortgagee's
right to foreclose and sell. * * * Impressed with the distress of
property owners and confident of its power to anticipate legisla-
tive relief this court of equity experiences no qualms and has no
hesitancy in making the direction under discussion." (Italics
mine.)
Other cases following somewhat the same line of reasoning
as in the case of Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp.!
have held that, where the legislature has already declared that an
emergency exists and fixed the period thereof, setting forth
certain remedies available to mortgagees, courts of equity are
not bound by the limitations of such legislative acts. These enact-
ments provide procedure and relief which are cognate to the
historic exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Equity will not,
accordingly, be circumscribed by the statutory dates if the
emergency in fact had an earlier origin or a later termination.
Such legislative enactments do not deprive a court of equity of
its inherent power to place limitations upon the remedies avail-
able to a mortgagee in consonance with fundamental doctrines
of equity. 26
A court of equity may, therefore, according to this line of
decisions, give equitable relief during such times as it deems
within the period of economic stress and emergency, which
period may be equal to or greater than that fixed by the
legislature.
But quite independently of statute or rule of court, a
court, of chancery has inherent power to order a sale of mortgaged
147 Misc. (N. Y.) 374, 383, 265 N. Y. S. 115, 124 (1933)."
Supra. Note 24.
• Monaghan v. May (1934), 242 App. Div. (N. Y.) 64, 273 N. Y. S.
475; Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp. (1933), 237 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 789, 263 N. Y. S. 359; Ulivarri v. Lovelace (1934), 39
N. lex. 36, 38 P. (2d) 1114.
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property and to control its process directed to that end.27 In like
manner equity has the inherent power to assume jurisdiction in
suits for foreclosure of mortgages, to fix the time and terms of
sale, and to refuse to confirm sales upon equitable grounds where
they are found to be unfair.2 s
This does not mean, however, that the court, without
statutory decision, may withhold a decree which is required
to be granted in conformity with the contract and the
statutory law governing foreclosure. In a cause of this sort
a court of chancery may not withhold from the mortgagee
the degree of foreclosure which is warranted under the law and
facts merely because of adverse conditions and the resultant
misfortunes to the mortgagor.29
If the Chancellor has the right and power to disregard clear
legal mandates or prohibit the enforcement of a right merely
when, in his judgment, justice is threatened, the trend would be
to greatly limit, if not entirely destroy, all dealings based upon
contract. No one would feel safe in loaning money upon the
solemn obligation of the borrower to repay it in accordance with
the terms of the loan; and the enforcement of this so-called
equitable doctrine would return to the people as a plague,
demoralizing all industrial and economic transactions based upon
obligations to perform, and result in untold hardships and
deprivations to a great mass of individuals. It would in one
stroke convert a government of law to one of men, because it
would be entirely within the power of the equity court to deter-
mine whether or not an emergency did, in fact, exist and whether
or not injustice would be done by enforcing the settled principles
and rules of law. It would result in different rules applicable to
one individual from another, and under similar circumstances,
7 Teachers Retirement Fund Assn. v. Pirie (1935), 150 Ore. 435,
46 P. (2d) 105; Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein(1933), 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Atl. 538; Jones on Mortgages, 8th Ed.,
Vol. 3, See. 2012.
2Williams v. Jones (1935), 165 Va. 398, 182 S. E. 280; Marneil
Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty Co. (1935), 119 N. J. Eq. 205, 181
Atl. 882; Monaghan v. May (1934), 242 App. Div. (N. Y.) 64, 273
N. Y. S. 475; Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp. (1933),
237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. S. 359; Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1932),
202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335.
"Haywood v. Rigsbee (1935), 207 N. C. 695, 178 S. E. 108; Loma
Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp. (1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.)
655, 265 N. Y. S. 125.
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dependent only upon as little as the whim or caprice of the judge
before whom the case is heard. 30
A court of equity has no jurisdiction to enforce a contract
void at law for want of power to make it, or in the absence of
fraud, accident, or mistake to so modify a contract so as to make
it legal and then enforce it. Courts of equity can no more dis-
regard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions
than can courts of law. They are bound by the positive pro-
visions of statutes and of the Constitution equally with courts of
law, and where the transaction or the contract is declared void
because not in compliance with express statutory and consti-
tutional provisions, a court of equity cannot interpose to give
validity to such transaction or contract or any part thereof.
Where the rights of the parties are clearly defined and estab-
lished by law, equity has no power to change or disturb
those rights, but in all such instances the maxim equitas sequitur
legem is strictly applicable, for where a rule either of statute
or common law is direct and governs the case in all its circum-
stances on the particular point, a court of equity may no more
depart from it than a court of law.31
If the contract of mortgage is by its terms legal and equita-
ble, the enforcement of such terms irrespective of what may be
the motive of the prosecutor of the action is entirely lawful and
therefore in a legal sense equitable. 32
Conceding that equity will enjoin an attempt to pervert a
power of sale from its legitimate purpose, yet it must have
substantial reasons for so doing. 33  The interests of society
IKenley v. Huntington Bldg. & Loan Assn., Inc. (1934), 166 id.
182, 170 Atl. 526.
11Magniac v. Thomson, 15 How. (56 U. S.) 281 (1853); Hedges v.
Dickson County, 150 U. S. 182, 14 Sup. Ct. 71 (1893); Brennan v.
American Tr. Co., 3 Calif. (2d) 653, 45 P. (2d) 207 (1935); Baumgarten
v. Haas, 68 Md. 32, 11 Atl. 588 (1887); Kenley v. Huntington Bldg.
Assn., Inc., 166 Md. 183, 170 Atl. 526 (1934); Davis v. Flagg, 35 N. J. Eq.
491 (1882); South Jersey Title & Finance Co. v. Ireland, 101 N. 5. Eq.
818, 138 Atl. 898 (1927); Marneil Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty
Corp., 119 N. J. Eq. 205, 181 Atl. 82 (1935); Cameron-Hawn Realty Co.
v. Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 101 N. E. 162 (1913); Loma Holding Corp. v.
Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 655, 265 N. Y. S. 125 (1933);
Doggett Lumber Co. v. Conrades, 195 N. C. 626, 143 S. E. 138 (1928);
First Nat. Bk. of Henderson v. Purvis, 201 N. C. 753, 161 S. E. 386
(1931); Story Eq. Jur., Vol. 1, Sec. 64; 10 R. C. L. 382; Pomeroy Eq.
Jur., 4th Ed., Vol. 1, Secs. 53, 54.
' South Jersey Title & Finance Co. v. Ireland (1927), 101 N. J. Eq.
818, 138 Atl. 898.
- See Note 19, page 372, supra.
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require that the power be not interfered with lightly, as it
results from a contract between the parties, and the party who
borrows must consider when he bargains whether he is not giving
too large a power to him with whom he is dealing. Accordingly,
jurisdiction will be exercised when, and only when, because of
fraud, or want of legality of consideration, or other cogent and
sufficient reasons, the enforcement of the collection is against
good conscience, or that particular circumstances, intrinsic to
the instrument, would render its enforcement in this manner
inequitable and work great and irreparable injury.34
Mere allegations to the effect that the time is unpropitious
for a sale, and that because of the existence of a great financial
14 Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 19 (1840);
Anderson v. White. 2 App. (D. C.) 408 (1894); Lipschultz v. Phillips,
51 App. (D. C.) 20, 273 Fed. 748 (1921); George v. Forest Glenn Land
Co., 52 App. (D. C.) 73, 281 Fed. 577 (1922); McCalley v. Otey, 90 Ala.
302, 8 So. 157 (1890); Sidney Land, etc., Co. v. Milner, etc., Lumber Co.,
138 Ala. 185, 35 So. 48 (1903); Hoop v. First Nat. Bk. of Reform, 206
Ala. 321, 89 So. 466 (1921); Culberhouse v. Hawthorne, 107 Ark. 462,
156 S. W. 421 (1913); Moore v. Calkins, 85 Calif. 177, 24 Pac. 729
(1890); Denver Transit, etc. Co. v. Bartle, 69 Colo. 570, 196 Pac. 860
(1921); Washington Tr. Co. v. Pittsburgh-Bartow Min. Mfg. Co., 136
Ga. 180, 71 S. E. 125 (1911); Tooke v. Newman, 75 Ill. 215 (1874);
Boyd v. Ellis, 11 With (Ia.) 97 (1860); Philips v. Adams Co., 52 La.
Ann. 442, 27 So. 65 (1899); Gato v. Christian, 112 Me. 427, 92 Atl. 489
(1914); Thrift v. Bannon, 111 Md. 303, 73 Atl. 660 (1909); Doxen v.
Wagner, 142 Md. 441, 121 Atl. 254 (1923); Macombs v. Elmes, 197
Mass. 19, 83 N. E. 306 (1907) ; American House Hotel Co. v. Hemming-
way, 237 Mass. 180, 129 N. E. 371 (1921); Case v. O'Brien, 66 Mich. 289,
33 N. W. 405 (1887) ; Moss v. Keary, 231 Mich. 295, 204 N. W. 93 (1925);
Michigan Tr. Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N. W. 844 (1933); Virginia
Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Hudson, 266 Mich. 644, 254 N. W. 234 (1934);
Calavaras Timber Co. v. Michigan Tr. Co., 278 Mich. 445, 270 N. W. 743
(1936); Armstrong v. Sanford, 7 Minn. 49 (1862); Montgomery v.
McEwen, 9 Minn. 103, (1864); Moller v. Robertson, 146 Minn. 265,
178 N. W. 590 (1920); Stewart v. Belt, 19 So. 957 (1896 Miss.);
Ramoneda v. Loggins, 39 So. 1007 (1906 Miss.); Foster v. Reynolds,
38 Mo. 553 (1866); Price v. Empire Loan Assn., 75 Mo. A. 551 (1898);
Dey v. Dey, 23 N. J. Eq. 88 (1872); Whitaker v. Hill, 96 N. C. 2, 1 S. E.
639 (1887); Eureka Lumber Co. v. Satchwell, 148 N. C. 316, 62 S. E.
310 (1908); Corey v. Hooker, 171 N. C. 229, 88 S. E. 236 (1916);
Guthrie v. Moore, 182 N. C. 24, 108 S. E. 334 (1921); Leak v. Armfleld,
187 N. C. 625, 122 S. E. 393 (1924); Beiseker v. Svendsgaard, 28 N. D.
366, 149 N. W. 352 (1914); Bonin v. Macktaz, - R. I. -, 129 Atl. 338
(1925); Holland v. Citizens Say. Bk., 16 R. I. 734, 19 Atl. 654 (1890);
Chapman v. Younger. 32 S. C. 295, 10 S. E. 1077 (1890); Grant County
v. Colonial & U. S. Mortgage Co., 3 S. D. 390, 53 N. W. 746 (1892);
Keith v. Harbison, 52 S. W. 1109 (1899 Tenn. Ch. App.); Corbitt v.
Sweeney, 151 S. W. 858 (1912 Tex. Civ. App.); Floor v. Morgan, 175
S. W. 737 (1915 Tex. Civ. App.); Powell v. Woodbury, 85 Vt. 504, 83 Atl.
541 (1912); Vought v. Rider, 83 Va. 659, 3 S. E. 293 (1887); Le Grand
v. Rixey, 83 Va. 862, 3 S. E. 864 (1887); Brown v. Click, 65 W. Va.
459, 64 S. E. 613 (1909); 19 R. C. L. 617, Sec. 434; 41 C. J. 930.
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depression the property will not bring anything near its true
value and could likely be sold for a better price later, present no
grounds for the interposition of equity jurisdiction by injunc-
tion predicated upon the principle that such a sale will work a
great or irreparable loss and injury to the debtor.35 Nor does
the fact that a prevailing economic depression renders payment
of the loan impossible constitute a defence of "impossibility of
performance."3 0
The probability, then, that conditions will considerably im-
prove and that the mortgagor, therefore, will be able in the near
future to discharge his indebtedness without embarrassment
does not merit the interference of equity, if for no other reason
than because it is too vague and indefinite to be capable of
enforcement. 37 The mortgagor enters into the contract, agreeing
as evidence of his good faith and intention to pay the debt, and
that if the debt is not paid at maturity the mortgagee shall have
the right to enforce the pledge and to have the property sold to
pay the debt or so much thereof as the pledged property will
produce; and some courts have gone so far as to hold that before
a mortgagor can have affirmative equitable relief, such as an
injunction to prevent the exercise of the power of sale by the
grantee in such mortgage, he must first pay or tender payment
to the mortgagee of the principle and lawful interest legally
due to him.3s
Though it be conceded that under the present market
conditions, property sold under a foreclosure sale would in all
probability bring a price so grossly inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the Chancellor and would accordingly create a
1Haywood v. Rigsbee (1935), 207 N. C. 695, 178 S. E. 108; Amer-
ican House Hotel Co. v. Hemingway (1921), 237 Mass. 180, 123 N. E.
371; Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1897). 138 Mo. 17, 39 S. W.
465; Case v. O'Brien (1887), 66 Mich. 289, 33 N. W. 405; Montgomery
v. McEwen (1864), 9 Minn. 103; Shonk v. Knight (1878), 12 W. Va.
667; Anchor Stove Works v. Gray (1876), 9 W. Va. 469; see also
note 14, sziepra.
36California Securities Co. v. Grosse (1935), 3 Cal. (2d) 732, 46
P. (2d) 170.
Stanton v. Mortgage Guarantee Co. (1934), 179 Ga. 867, 177 S. E.
566; Deprisco v. Rykaczewski (1931), 18 Del. Ch. 212, 157 At. 209.
Marneil Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty Corp. (1935), 119
N. J. Eq. 205, 181 AtI. 882; Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty
Corp. (1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.) 655, 265 N. Y. S. 125; Stanton v. Mort-
gage Guarantee Co. (1934), 179 Ga. 867, 177 S. E. 556; Liles v. Bank(1921), 151 Ga. 483, 107 S. E. 490; Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. Albany
(1913), 207 N. Y. 377, 101 N. D. 162.
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presumption of fraud, irregularity or unfairness sufficient to
warrant the disaffirmance of the sale, even so the court should
not, without cogent reasons, enjoin the sale. If upon such sale the
property does, in fact, bring such an unsatisfactory and uncon-
scoinahble price, then is the time for the debtor to interpose an
objection to the confirmation of the sale, but the court should not
anticipate a sale at such an unconscionably inadequate price. 39
It will be assumed, in the absence of positive averments to the
contrary, that the mortgagee intends to offer the property for
sale in such a manner that it will not be unwarrantedly
sacrified. 40
Upon proper application a court of equity will refuse to
confirm and %ill set aside a sale made by its officers when con-
ducted contrary to principles of law. The power of the court
to so interfere cannot be denied; but to justify the interference,
there must be a foundation laid-either fraud or mistake or
accident must be averred, by which the rights of the parties have
been affected.41
On motion to confirm a sale the court should carefully
examine the proceedings, and if they are in conformity with the
statutes in such cases, and provided there are no other conditions,
should ordinarily confirm the sale. All the authorities hold
uniformly, however, that gross inadequacy of consideration
coupled with additional circumstances is sufficient reason for
refusing confirmation. 42
Some jurisdictions hold that mere inadequacy of price, how-
ever gross, is not sufficient ground to justify the Chancellor in
refusing to confirm a sale legally made in the absence of addi-
tional extenuating circumstances. 43 Though if the inadequacy
19 Equitable Life Assn. v. Lickness (1935), 63 S. Dak. 618, 262 N. W.
206; Fifth Ave. Bank of New York v. Compson (1933), 113 N. J. Eq.
152, 166 Atl. 86; Kotler v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1933),
113 N. J. Eq. 544, 168 Atl. 36; United Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Neuman(1933), 113 N. J. Eq. 244, 166 Atl. 537; Ryan v. Wilson (1903), 64 N. 3.
Eq. 797, 52 Atl. 993, 53 Atl. 1039; Morisse v. Inglis (1890), 46 N. J. Eq.
306, 19 Atl. 16.
Ewing v. Bay Minette Land Co. (1936), 232 Ala. 22, 166 So. 409.
4 Karel v. Davis (1937), 122 N. J. Eq. 526, 194 Atl. 545.
-Fioiie v. First Nat. Bank (1935), 173 Okla. 501, 49 P. (2d) 145.
"Wells v. Lenox, 108 Ark. 366, 159 S. W. 1099 (1912); Hawkins
v. Wood, 179 Ark. 845, 18 S. W. (2d) 371 (1929); Federal Land Bank
of St. Louis v. Floyd, 187 Ark. 616, 61 S. W. (2d) 449 (1933); Rauer v.
Hertweck, 175 Calif. 278, 165 Pac. 946 (1917); Bock v. Losekamp, 179
Calif. 674, 179 Pac. 516 (1919); Jones v. Sierra Verdugo Warer Co.,
63 Cal. App. 254, 218 Pac. 454 (1923); Bechtel v. Clemons, 12 Calif.
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of price is gross, the Chancellor will invariably seize upon other
circumstances tending to impeach the fairness of the transaction
as a cause for vacating the sale, and where the inadequacy is so
great and appalling as to shock the conscience of the Chancellor,
only the slightest of circumstances, insufficient in themselves to
warrant intervention, but which tend to infer unfairness in the
conduct of the sale, will be considered sufficient to justify the
refusal of confirmation. 44 In determining whether to refuse
confirmation it ought to be that the more sacrificial the price,
the less will be the degree of unfairness required in the other
circumstances presented, and, per contra, the less the degree of
inadequacy of price, the greater the degree of unfairness
manifested by the other circumstances. 45 But these circum-
stances impeaching the fairness of the transaction should relate
to the conduct of the officer making the sale or to the conduct of
an interested party participating in and being benefited by the
App. (2d) 309, 55 P. (2d) 531 (1936); Hamilton v. Quimby, 46 Ill. 90
(1867); Bock v. Hooper, 318 Ill. 182, 149 N. E. 21 (1925); Logar v.
O'Brien, 339 Ill. 628, 171 N. E. 629 (1930); Clegg v. Christensen, 346
Il1. 314, 178 N. E. 925 (1931); Hecht v. Hoogmoed, 111 N. J. Eq. 331,
162 Atl. 873 (1932); State v. Wilson, 124 Okla. 236, 254 Pac. 968 (1927);
University of Tulsa v. Moores, 177 Okla. 548, 61 P. (2d) 25 (1936); Fen-
ton v. JokI, 294 Pa. 309, 144 Atl. 136 (1928); Plummer v. Wilson, 322
Pa. 118, 185 Atl. 311 (1936); In re Wallace, 179 S. Car. 480, 184 S. E.
849 (1936); Gregg v. First Nat. Bank, 26 S. W. (2d) 179 (1930 Tex.
Civ. App.); Hodges v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 44 S. W. (2d)
400 (1931 Tex. Civ. App.); Cocke v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 75 S. W.
(2d) 194 (1934 Tex. Civ. App.); Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 Utah
586, 268 Pac. 781 (1928).
"Clemons v. Union Trust Co. (1936), 170 Md. 520, 185 At. 462;
University of Tulsa v. Moores (1936), 177 Okla. 548, 61 P. (2d) 25;
Melton v. Tipton (1936), 264 Ky. 196, 94 S. W. (2d) 350; Hecht
v. Hoogmoed (1932), 111 N. J. Eq. 331, 162 Atl. 873; In re Wallace
(1936), 179 S. Car. 480, 184 S. E. 849; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis
v. Floyd (1933), 187 Ark. 616, 61 S. W. (2d) 449; Henderson v. Hen-
derson (1936), 266 Ky. 319, 98 S. W. (2d) 904; Kentucky Joint Land
Bank v. Fitzpatrick (1931), 237 Ky. 624, 36 S. W. (2d) 25; Roberson v.
Matthews (1931), 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496; Clegg v. Christensen
(1931), 346 Ill. 314, 178 N. E. 925; Logar v. O'Brien (1930), 339 I1.
628, 171 N. E. 629; Federal Land Bank v. Curts (1927), 45 Idaho 414,
262 Pac. 877; Rospigliosi v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co. (1916), 237
Fed. 341; Smith v. Holowell (1923), 201 Ky. 271, 256 S. W. 408; Dur-
ham v. Elliott (1918), 180 Ky. 724, 203 S. W. 539; Fenton v. Joki (1928),
294 Pa. 309, 144 Atl. 136; Lefever v. Kline (1928), 294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl.
488; Block v. Hooper (1925), 318 Ill. 182, 149 N. E. 21; State v. Wilson
(1927), 124 Okla. 236, 254 Pac. 968; Weir v. Weir (1928), 196 N. C. 268,
145 S. E. 281; Union & Planters Bank & Tr. Co. v. Pope (1928), 176
Ark. 1023, 5 S. W. (2d) 330; Schroeder v. Young (1896), 161 U. S. 334,
16 Sup. Ct. 512; Graffan v. Burgess (1886), 117 U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686.
0 Louisville Title Co. v. Ramsey (1935), 258 Ky. 183, 79 S. W. (2d)
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sale. A sale will not be set aside for causes that the parties in
interest might, with a reasonable degree of diligence have
obviated. 46
Where the inadequacy is gross the purchaser' at a judgment
sale can retain his advantage only by showing that he acquired
title by proceedings free from fraud or irregularity. In such a
case irregularity does not necessarily mean that there was unfair-
ness or fraud. If the sale were attended by mistake, surprise,
misapprehension or accident as a result of which the complaining
party was prevented from attending the sale and protecting his
interest, the Chancellor will ordinarily refuse to confirm such a
sale, provided that the inadequacy can in some way be traced to,
or connected with, or is a result of such mistake, surprise, mis-
apprehension or accident. 47
There is a wide variance in the opinions of the courts as to
the duty and responsibility vested in an officer conducting a
judicial sale.
It has been held that it is the duty of a sheriff at a julicial
sale to secure the best possible price for property being sold.
In the event that he is confronted with only one bid and that bid
is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of a fair and
6In re Wallace (1936), 179 S. C. 480, 184 S. D. 849; Certain Lands
v. Coronado Beach (1937), 128 Fla. 884, 175 So. 774; Kentucky Joint
Land Bank v. Fitzpatrick (1931), 237 Ky. 624, 36 S. W. (2d) 25; Hen-
derson v. Henderson (1936), 266 Ky. 319, 98 S. W. (2d) 904; Loma
Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp. (1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.)
655, 265 N. Y. S. 125; Clemens v. Union Tr. Co. (1936), 170 Md. 520, 185
Atl. 462; Stallings v. Annapolis Sav. Inst. (1934), 167 Md. 4, 172 Atl.
283; Rospigliosi v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co. (1916), 237 Fed. 341;
Block v. Hooper (1925), 318 Ill. 182, 149 N. E. 21; Smith v. Holowell(1923), 201 Ky. 271, 256 S. W. 408; Jones v. Sierra Verdugo Water Co.
(1923), 63 Cal. App. 254, 218 Pac. 454; Evans Marble v. Abrams (1917),
131 Md. 204, 101 Atl. 964; Lefever v. Kline (1928), 294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl.
488; Griswold v. Barden (1911), 146 Wis. 35, 130 N. W. 952; Thomas v.
Fewster (1902), 95 Md. 446, 52 Atl. 750; Graffan v. Burgess (1886),
117- U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686; Stewart v. Devries (1895), 81 Md. 525,
32 Atl. 285; Meehan v. Blodgett (1893), 86 Wis. 511, 57 N. W. 291.
47Hecht v. Hoogmoed (1932), 111 N. J. Eq. 331, 162 Atl. 873; Hen-
derson v. Henderson (1936), 266 Ky. 319, 98 S. W. (2d) 904; Certain
Lands v. Coronado Beach (1937), 128 Fla. 884, 175 So. 774; Block v.
Hooper (1925), 318 Ill. 182, 149 N. E. 21; Smith v. Holowell (1923),
201 Ky. 271, 256 S. W. 408; Stortz v. Voss (1918), 181 Ky. 546, 205
S. W. 610; Greer v. McAninch (1928), 226 Ky. 644, 11 S. W. (2d) 696;
Frensley v. American Nat. Bk. (1927), 129 Okla. 164, 264 Pac. 188;
Wheeler & Motter Merc. v. Wright (1917), 64 Okla. 97, 166 Pac. 184;
Union & Planters Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Pope (1928), 176 Ark. 1023, 5 S. W.(2d) 330; Moore v. McJudkins (1918), 136 Ark. 292, 206 S. W. 445;
Chapin v. Quisenberry (1919), 138 Ark. 68, 210 S. W. 341; Wofford v.
Young (1927), 173 Ark. 802, 293 S. W. 725.
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honest man; it is his duty under the circumstances to postpone
the sale and report to the court that the property has not been
sold for want of bidders. If property sold under such conditions
brings an inadequate price, the failure of the sheriff to so act
may result in the necessary additional circumstances required to
cause the court to refuse confirmation of the sale.48
On the other hand, however, it has been held that it cannot
be assumed that the sheriff is advised as to the actual value of
the property which he is selling. He simply carries out the man-
date of the court contained in the general or special execution
which the clerk delivered to him. It is not his duty to examine
the property. He may or may not have seen the property, but it
cannot be expected that he has formed any opinion as to the
value thereof. The question of the adequacy of price bid should
be presented to the court at or before the time an order con-
firming the sale is asked for.4 9
Where a sale is not tainted with fraud, mistake or miscon-
duct which works an injustice to the party complaining, and
inadequacy of price is the sole reliance for the objection to con-
firmation, the controlling rule in determining whether or not the
hale should be confirmed is quite different from the rule to be
applied where these elements are present.30
Inadequacy of price is a highly important objection to the
confirmation of a sale, but the rule is well settled that a judicial
sale regularly made in a manner prescribed by law, upon due
notice, and without apparent fraud, unfairness, surprise or
mistake, will not generally be set aside or refused confirmation
on account of mere inadequacy of price, however great, unless
the inadequacy is so gross and inordinate as to shock the con-
seience of the Chancellor and create the presumption of fraud,
unfairness or mistake.' 1 Indeed it has been held that inade-
"*Dunn v. Ponceler (1937), 235 Ala. 269, 178 So. 40; Federal Land
Bank v. Curts (1927), 45 Idaho 414, 262 Pac. 877.
" Betz v. Tower Savings Bank (1936), 185 Wash. 314, 55 P. (2d) 338.
"'Keyser v. Federal Land Bank of Baltimore (1937), 169 Va. 368,
193 S. E. 489.1 Clark v. Freedman's Say. & Tr. Co., 100 U. S. 149 (1879); Pewabic
Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct. 887 (1892); Ballentyne
v. Smithe, 205 U. S. 285, 27 Sup. Ct. 527 (1907); Rospigliosi v. New
Orleans M. & C. R. Co., 237 Fed. 341 (1916); Speers Sand & Clay Works
v. American Tr. Co., 52 F. (2d) 831 (1931); Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Inter. Com. Eng. Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (1933); Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. Vaughn, 82 F. (2d) 978 (1936); United States Nat. Bk. v. Pamp,
83 F. (2d) 493 (1936); Guaranty Tr. Co. v. Williamsport Wire Rope
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quacy of price will not sustain disaffirmance unless it be so
manifestly gross as to strike the mind with amazement.5 2 And
even then the party seeking to have the sale disapproved for
gross inadequacy of price should, generally speaking, guaranty
an advance bid in case of a resale, or give security that there will
be no loss.53
The question next arises as to just how grossly inadequate,
in fact, the price realized must be, in order to successfully create
a presumption of fraud or irregularity in the sale. It has been
held that property selling for from less than 5% up to
34% of its appraised value is so low and shocking to the Court
as to be irreconcilable with the true worth of the property.5 4
Co., 20 F. Supp. 634 (1937); Dunn v. Ponceler, 235 Ala. 269, 178 So. 40
(1937); Gleason v. Boone, 123 Ark. 523, 185 S. W. 1093 (1916); Horn
v. Hull, 169 Ark. 463, 275 S. W. 905 (1925); Royal v. McVay, 180 Ark.
973, 23 S. W. (2d) 983 (1930); In re Downham, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.)
295, 165 Atl. 152 (1932); Kontz v. Citizens & Son. Nat. Bk., 181 Ga. 70,
181 S. E. 764 (1935); Illinois Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Conard, 288 Ill.
App. 475, 6 N. E. (2d) 232 (1937); Glenn v. Miller, 186 Ia. 1187, 173
N. W. 135 (1919); Rohrs v. McGlasson, 250 Ky. 140, 61 S. W. (2d) 1087
(1933); Louisville Title Co. v. Ramsey, 258 Ky. 183, 79 S. W. (2d) 693;
Fidelity & Columbia Tr. Co. v. White Const. Co., 258 Ky. 475, 80 S. W.
(2d) 550 (1935); Aulenbrock v. Blakemore, 262 Ky. 157, 89 S. W. (2d)
635 (1935); Melton v. Tipton, 264 Ky. 196, 94 S. W. (2d) 350 (1936);
Henderson v. Henderson, 266 Ky. 319, 94 S. W. (2d) 904; Evans Marble
v. Abrams, 131 Md. 204, 101 Atl. 964; Clemens v. Union Trust Co., 170
Md. 520, 185 Atl. 462 (1936); Stallings v. Annapolis Say. Inst., 16T
Md. 4, 172 Atl. 283 (1934); Northland Pine Co. v. Northland Insulating
Co., 145 Minn. 395, 177 N. W. 635 (1920); First Nat. Bk. v. Hunt, 101
Nebr. 743, 165 N. W. 139 (1917); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Heany,
122 Nebr. 747, 241 N. W. 525 (1932); Federal Land Bank v. Radke, 122
Nebr. 834, 241 N. W. 752 (1932); E. H. Loughee, Inc. v. Matters, 124 Nebr.
242, 246 N. W. 242 (1933) ; Physicians Casualty Assn. v. Brownfield, 133
Nebr. 906, 277 N. W. 599 (1938); Guaranty Tr. Co. v. Fitzgerald Hotel
& Develop. Corp., 97 N. J. Eq. 277, 127 Atl. 672 (1925) ; New Jersey Nat.
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Savemore Realty Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 478, 152 Atl. 480
(1931); Karel v. Davis, 122 N. J. Eq. 526, 194 At. 545 (1937); Las
Vegas Ry. & P. Co. v. Trust Co., 15 N. Mex. 634, 110 Pac. 856 (1910);
Chem. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Adam-Schumann Assn., Inc., 150 Misc. 221, 268
N. Y. S. 674 .(1934); State v. Harrower 167 Okla. 269, 29 P. (2d) 123
(1934); Fiolle v. First Nat. Bk., 173 Okla. 501, 49 P. (2d) 145 (1935);
Keyser v. Federal Land Bank, 169 Va. 368, 193 S. E. 489 (1937); 16
R. C. L. 95.
2Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Vaughn (1936), 82 F. (2d) 978.
" Illinois Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Conard (1937), 288 Ill. App. 475,
6 N. E. (2d) 232; Schulz v. Hasse (1907), 227 Ill. 156, 81 N. E. 50.
5'University of Tulsa v. Moores (1936), 177 Okla. 548, 61 P. (2d)
25; State v. Harrower (1934), 167 Okla. 269, 29 P. (2d) 123; Fiolle v.
First Nat. Bk. (1935), 173 Okla. 501, 49 P. (2d) 145; Citizens State
Bk. v. McRoberts (1925), 29 Ariz. 173, 239 Pac. 1028; Suring State
Bank v. Giese (1933), 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556; Chem. Bk. & Tr. Co.
v. Adam-Schumann Assn. (1934), 150 Misc. (N. Y.) 221, 268 N. Y. S.
674.
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On the other hand, property selling for from 331/3% to 75% of
its reasonable value, and a leasehold estate selling for 25%1 of its
appraised value has been held not sufficiently inadequate as to
indicate fraud, duress, or oppression, and justify a court in
refusing confirmation., In any event the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff to affirmatively prove that the value of
the property is so much greater than the amount realized from
the sale that the price so received is, as a matter of fact, grossly
inadequate.5 6
Assuming that the price obtained for the property is so
wantonly sacrificial of its reasonable value that it admittedly
shocks the conscience of the Chancellor and warrants his pre-
sumption of fraud, still there remains the question of upon
what appraisal the value of the property should be predicated.
For all property is continually fluctuating in value, and
naturally during a period of economic depression it will be less
desirable than in other times. 7 The result of general adverse
economic conditions, however, must be assumed to operate on all
alike and therefor the mortgagor and the mortgagee must come
alike under the hardships incident thereto. 5s The sale price of
the property may be grossly inadequate as compared with its
appraised value at the time the contract was entered into, and
yet it may be entirely adequate if compared with its value as
based upon the current market at the time the property is sold.
Where the sale of mortgaged property is for a fair and reasona-
ble price at the time of the sale, and where a resale would not
result in a higher price, the sale should be confirmed.5 9
6Int re Yost & Cook (1934), 70 F. (2d) 614; Lemere v. White
(1932); 122 Nebr. 676, 241 N. W. 105; Physicians Cas. Assn. v. Brown-
field (1938), 133 Nebr. 906, 277 N. W. 599; Rohrs v. McGlasson (1933),
250 Ky. 140, 61 S. W. (2d) 1087; Aulenbrock v. Blakemore (1935), 262
Ky. 157, 89 S. W. (2d) 635; Fenton v. Joki (1928), 294 Pa. 309, 144
Atl. 136.
wRoyal Highlander v. Louthan (1932), 123 Nebr. 469, 243 N. W.
267; First Nat. Bk. v. Hunt (1917), 101 Nebr. 743, 165 N. W. 139; Blank-
enship v. Mongini (1928), 105 W. Va. 530, 143 S. E. 301; Bennett v.
Ford (1912), 113 Va. 442, 74 S. E. 394.
5 Barnard v. First Nat. Bk. (1936), 176 Okla. 501, 49 P. (2d) 145.
56Marneil Realty Corp. v. Twin Brook Realty Corp. (1935), 119
N. J. Eq. 205, 181 Atl. 882
9 Standard Lumber & Mlfg. Co. v. Deposit Bank & Guar. Tr. Co.
(1934), 169 Miss. 120, 152 So. 639; Thomas v. Central Hanover Bank
& Tr. Co. (1934), 64 App. (D. C.) 96, 75 F. (2d) 227; Loma Holding
Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp. (1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.) 655, 265
N. Y. S. 125; Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1897), 138 Mo. 17,
39 S. W. 465.
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The Chancellor must, it is plain to see, strive for some
"yardstick "--some measure of values-in order to determine the
true worth of the mortgaged or pledged property, and subse-
quently reach a fair conclusion as to whether or not the sale
price is, in fact, grossly inadequate.
The principles by which courts are governed in deciding
upon the adequacy of the price realized in private sales are very
different from those controlling in public sales. The price paid
for property at a private sale is only presumptive evidence of
its value, while on the other hand, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, the highest competitive bid at an open judicial sale,
properly advertised and fairly conducted, is usually accepted by
courts as a fair criterion of the value of the property sold.
In the one" case slight inadequacy and reasonable expectation of
a better price is sometimes held sufficient to justify the setting
aside of a sale where the approval of the court is necessary or
where it is invoked; while in the other, inadequacy must be
gross, and the prospect of a better price practically demonstrable
or the circumstances such as to indicate the absence of fair
competition, in order to warrant the refusal of confirmation.
After-stated opinions, affidavits of undervalue, and the like are
regarded with little favor, and are entitled to little weight in
comparison with the fact established by the auction, and its
results. The amount bid, however, whether at a private or
public sale is not conclusive of the value, but is a fact which must
be weighed with the other evidence in determining whether the
purchase price is an adequate one under the existing circum-
stances of the particular case.60
In normal times a sale at public auction will avoid the sacri-
fice of property at a grossly inadequate sale price. This premise
is predicated upon the theory that a thing which cannot be sold
has no value, and that it is worth just what a purchaser will
,Keyser v. Fed. Land Bank of Baltimore (1937), 169 Va. 368, 193
S. B. 489; Plummer v. Wilson (1936), 322 Pa. 118, 185 Atl. 311; Thomas
v. Central Hanover Bk. & Tr. Co. (1934), 64 App. (D. C.) 96, 75 F. (2d)
227; Merchants Nat. Bk. v. Ralphsnyder (1933), 113 W. Va. 480, 169
S. E. 89; Blankenship v. Mongini (1928), 105 W. Va. 530, 143 S. E. 301;
Bennett v. Ford (1912), 113 Va. 442, 74 S. E. 394; Weinstein v. Boyd
(1920), 136 Md. 227, 110 At. 506; Mason v. Hubner (1906), 104 Md. 554,
65 Atl. 367; Nitrophos. Syn. v. Johnson (1902), 100 Va. 774, 42 S. E.
995; South Balto. Co. v. Kirby (1899), 89 Md. 52, 42 Atl. 913; Hazle-
wood v. Forrer (1897), 94 Va. 703, 27 S. E. 507; Bradford v. McConi-
hay (1879), 15 W. Va. 732; 23 C. J. 57.
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pay for it, and no more, and that if the only price offered con-
stitutes but a negligible part of its theretofore assumed value,
it nevertheless represents the value of property at the time.
During periods of depression, however, the device of a judicial
sale sometimes fails in its intended purpose because of the lack
(f competitive bidding. Moreover, it must be remembered that
though at the time of the sale it may be difficult to translate the
true value of the property into terms of dollars, yet it may have
a great potential or future value which may legitimately be
taken into account. c'
After taking cognizance of all the intricacies and circum-
stances of a particular proceeding, the decision as to whether
the price bid is grossly inadequate or whether there are other
grounds upon which confirmation of the sale should be refused
is a matter resting within the judgment and discretion of the
tribunal ordering the sale; it is to be remembered, however, that
this power resting in the Chancellor is not an arbitrary one, but
one to be exercised in accordance with established principles of
law and equity., 2 And the judgment of the trial court in con-
firming or rejecting a judicial sale, will not ordinarily be dis-
turbed unless it appears to the appellate court that there has
manifestly been an abuse of discretion. 3
13 Suring State Bank v. Giese (1933), 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556.12 Currin v. Nourse (1933), 66 F. (2d) 137; Cooke v. Southland Life
Ins. Co. (1934 Tex. Civ. App.), 75 S. W. (2d) 194; Hodges v. Common-
wealth Bk. & Tr. Co. (1931 Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. (2d) 400; Gregg
v. First Nat. Bk. (1930 Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. (2d) 179; Bovay V.
Townsend (1935), 78 F. (2d) 343; Kentucky Joint Land Bk. v. Fitz-
patrick (1931), 237 Ky. 624, 36 S. W. (2d) 25; Speers Sand & Clay
Works v. American Tr. Co. (1931), 52 F. (2d) 831; Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. Inter. Com. Eng. Corp. (1933), 66 F. (2d) 409; Clegg v. Christensen(1931), 346 Ill. 314, 178 N. E. 925; Hawkins v. Wood (1929), 179 Ark.
845, IS S. W. (2d) 371; Fiolle v. First Nat. Bk. (1935), 173 Okla. 501, 49
P. (2d) 145; Commonwealth Tr. Co. v. Harkins (1933), 312 Pa. 402,
167 Atl. 278; Chicago City Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Johnson (1938), 293 Iln.
App. 564, 13 N. E. (2d) 191; Levy v. Broadway-Carmen Bldg. Corp.(1937), 366 Ill. 279, 8 N. E. (2d) 671; Northland Pine Co. v. Northland
Ins. Co. (1920), 145 'Minn. 395, 177 N. W. 635; Jacobsohn v. Larkey(1917), 245 Fed. 538; Lefever v. Kline (1928), 294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl. 488;
Rader v. Bussey (1924), 313 Ill. 226, 145 N. E. 192; Watkins v. Justice
(1917), 256 Pa. 37, 100 Atl. 488; Chapin v. Quisenberry (1919), 138
Ark. 68, 210 S. W. 341; Snyder v. Snyder (1914), 244 Pa. 331, 90 Atl.
717; Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason (1892), 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct.
887; Stroup v. Raymond (1897), 183 Penn. 279, 38 Atl. 626; Hart V.
Burch (1889), 130 Ill. 426, 22 N. E. 831; Jennings v. Dunphy (1898),
174 Ill. 86, 50 N. E. 1045; 16 R. C. L. 95.
6Bovay v. Townsend (1935), 78 F. (2d) 343; Currin v. Nourse
(1933), 66 F. (2d) 137; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Inter. Com. Eng. Corp.
(1933), 66 F. (2d) 409; Speers Sand & Clay Wks. v. Amer. Tr. Co.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The court being in fact the vendor may consent or not in its
discretion to the sale. Prior to its consent by means of confirma-
tion, the sale by the master or sheriff is not a sale in a legal sense
and the accepted bidder acquires no independent right to have
his purchase completed but the transaction remains only a pre-
ferred proposal until confirmed by the court.6 After the sale
has been fairly made and confirmed, however, and all the parties
in interest have had an opportunity to bid on the property at
the sale, neither inadequacy of price or offers of better prices,
nor anything but actual fraud, accident, mistake, or some other
cause for which equity would void a like sale between private
parties will warrant the court in voiding the confirmation of the
sale or in opening the latter and receiving subsequent bids, for
the order confirming the sale is equivalent to an adjudication
that the sale was one properly to be approved and creates a pre-
sumption of the regularity of the proceedings; nor is the actual
receipt of a higher bid sufficient reason for voiding the sale if
the bidder had an opportunity to make his bid in the first
instance. 65 With this rule in force, the burden is on the appel-
lant to overcome the presumption by a proper showing.0 6 It is
the purpose of the law that judicial sales should be final.67
(1931), 52 F. (2d) 831; Kentucky Joint Land Bk. v. Fitzpatrick (1931),
237 Ky. 624, 36 S. W. (2d) 25; Commonwealth Tr. Co. v. Harkins (1933),
312 Pa. 402, 167 Atl. 278; Ruff v. Guaranty Title & Tr. Co. (1930), 99
Fla. 197, 126 So. 383; Illinois Joint Stock Land Bk. v. Conard (1937),
288 Ill. App. 475, 6 N. E. (2d) 232; Clegg v. Christensen (1931), 346
Ill. 314, 178 N. E. 925; Worden v. Rayburn (1924) 313 Ill. 495, 145
N. E. 101; Mitchell v. Mason (1918), 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163; Somer-
ville v. Hill (1918), 260 Pa. 477, 104 Atl. 62; Lefever v. Kline (1928),
294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl. 488; Jacobsohn v. Larkey (1917), 245 Fed. 538;
Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason (1892), 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct. 887.
"Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson (1938), 293 Ill. App.
564, 13 N. E. (2d) 191; Levy v. Broadway Carmen Bldg. Corp. (1937),
366 Ill. 279, 8 N. E. (2d) 671; Jennings v. Dunphy (1898), 174 Ill. 86,
50 N. E. 1045; Park v. Burch (1889), 130 Ill. 426, 22 N. E. 831.
Chicago City :Bank & Tr. Co. v. Johnson (1938), 293 Ill. App. 564,
13 N. E. (2d) 191; Rohrs v. McGlasson (1933), 250 Ky. 140, 61 S. W.(2d) 1087; Brennan v. Amer. Tr. Co. (1935), 3 Calif. (2d) 635, 45
P. (2d) 207; Howells St. Bk. v. Hardes (1934), 126 Nebr. 356, 253 N. W.
410; Hill v. Campbell (1933), 125 Nebr. 585, 251 N. W. 106; Lewis v.
Neslund (1934), 128 Nebr. 98, 257 N. W. 666; Ruff v. Gty. Title & Tr.
Co. (1930), 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 383; Mitchell v. Mason (1918), 75 Fla.
679, 79 So. 163; Morrison v. Burnette (1907), 154 Fed. 617; 16
R. C. L. 100.
"Ruff v. Gty. Title & Tr. Co. (1930), 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 383;
Mitchell v. Mason (1918), 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163.
e'Rospigliosi v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co. (1916), 237 Fed. 341;
Northland Pine Co. v. Northland Ins. Co. (1920), 145 Minn. 395,
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The cogent and all sufficient reason for this rule, is that
judicial sales would become farces and rational men would shun
them and refuse to bid, if after the confirmation unsuccessful
bidders or dissatisfied litigants could avoid them -and secure new
sales by offer of higher prices, when they thought the purchase
a fortunate one and thus secure the profits in that event, and
leave the buyer to suffer the loss if the property depreciated in
value, or if the purchase was unwise. It is of the greatest im-
portance, in order that property may bring a fair price, to
encourage bidding by giving to every bidder the benefits of bids
made in good faith and without collusion or misconduct, and at
least when the price offered is not unconscionably below the
market value of the property. Nothing could more evidently
tend to discourage and prevent bidding than a judicial deter-
mination that such a bidder may be deprived of the advantage of
his accepted bid whenever any purchaser is willing to give a
better price.68
Public policy and justice to the interests of all the parties
require that the ratification of judicial sales by courts having
jurisdiction over them should be final and conclusive, in the
absence of irregularities made by the court, or unless the pur-
chaser was prevented by misrepresentation or fraud from mak-
ing his objections to the ratification in due time. And it must
further appear that such misrepresentation or fraud resulted
from some act or conduct on the part of the trustees or on the
part of someone interested in the proceedings. 69
This well known practice is in accord with the policy of our
laws respecting such sales, which are required to be made after
sufficient publicity and by public outcry to the highest bidder.
The interests of the owners in particular cases must give way to
the maintenance of the practice which in general, is in the highest
degree beneficial. 70
With this end in view, and realizing that without stability in
177 N. W. 635; Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason (1892), 145 U. S. 349, 12
Sup. Ct. 887.G6Chicago City Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Johnson (1938), 293 Ill. App. 564,
13 N. E. (2d) 191; New Jersey Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Savemore Realty
Co. (1931), 107 N. J. Eq. 478, 153 Atl. 480; Free v. Harris (1930), 181
Ark. 644, 27 S. W. (2d) 510; Greer v. McAninch (1928), 226 Ky. 644,
11 S. W. (2d) 696; Morrison v. Burnette (1907), 154 Fed. 617; Morrisse
v. Inglis (1890), 46 N. J. Eq. 306, 19 Atl. 16.
Clemens v. Union Trust Co. (1936), 170 Md. 520, 185 Atl. 462.
'Free v. Harris (1930), 181 Ark. 644, 27 S. W. (2d) 510.
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judicial sales property cannot be expected to bring its full value,
it long ha been the settled rule that mere inadequacy of price,
standing alone, is insufficient grounds for setting aside a sale
unless the circumstances attending the sale may reasonably be
calculated to have caused such inadequacy. This policy of the
law is founded on the interests of the owner and purchaser
alike.7 '
The purchaser at a judicial sale has rights that require the
protection of law the same as the owner. And to deprive a bona
fide purchaser of the benefits derived from an advantageous bid
made at a fairly and lawfully conducted sale, without just and
cogent reasons for so doing, or to enjoin a mortgagee from the
exercise of his legal right to foreclose a mortgage upon default,
merely because the time happened to be unpropitious for the
sale, smirks suspiciously of deprivation of property without due
process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United
States.7 2
It is true that in extraordinary times equity will invoke
extraordinary remedies, still economic conditions however
deplorable can never warrant a court's disregard of the consti-
tutional rights of the parties.73  ' Extraordinary conditions may
call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily
stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside
the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinal condi-
tions do not create or enlarge constitutional power," said Chief
Justice Hughes in the Schechter case ;74 and again in the Blais-
dell case :75 "Emergency does not create power. Emergency
71 Chicago Title & Tr. Co. v. Robin (1935), 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4:
Clegg v. Christensen (1931), 346 Ill. 314, 173 N. E. 725; Greer v.
McAninch (1928), 226 Ky. 644, 11 S. W. (2d) 696; Marten v. Jirkovsky(1927), 174 Ark. 417, 295 S. W. 365; Crist v. McCoy (1919), 287 Ill. 641,
122 N. E. 857; Buckner's Trustee v. Buckner (1916), 168 Ky. 302, 181
S. W. 1107; Jones v. Deposit & Peoples Bank (1918), 180 Ky. 395, 202
S. W. 907; Rospigliosi v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co. (1916), 237 Fed.
341; Ballentyne v. Smith (1907), 205 U. S. 285, 27 Sup. Ct. 527;
Stevenson v. Gault (1917), 131 Ark. 397, 199 S. W. 112; Pewabic Mining
Co. v. Mason (1892), 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct. 887.
2 Fifth Amendment, Constitution of the United States; 14th Amend-
ment, Section 1, Constitution of the United States.
"Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Lickness (1935), 63 S. Dak. 618,
262 N. W. 206.
" Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), 295 U. S. 495,
528, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 842.
7 Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U. S. 398, 425,
54 Sup. Ct. 231, 235.
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does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Con-
stitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants
of power *** were determined in the light of emergency and
they are not altered by emergency. What power was thus granted
and what limitations were thus imposed are questions which have
always been, and always will be, the subject of close examina-
tion under our constitutional system."
The framers of the Constitution, imbued with the wisdom
obtained by experience and study of the causes of the rise and
fall of republics, ancient and modern, and seeking the stability
and perpetuity of the government then in process of formation,
set about the great task of formulating the Constitution which,
when completed, was submitted to the people for ratification.
One of the great objects, if not the paramount purpose, was to
declare in plain and unambiguous language a written Constitu-
tion which, when adopted should be, as it has been throughout
the life of the republic, and is now, the supreme law of the land
guaranteeing to the people as a whole the right of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, and at the same time by definite
limitation, controlling the various branches of the government
and bringing within certain bounds the powers of those from
time to time entrusted with the administration of public affairs.
Such a Constitution is written evidence of the people's will, and
is binding alike upon every officer or branch of the government
and the individuals who comprise the nation as a whole. 70
"Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors." said
Justice Davies in Ex parte Aiilligan.7 7 "Those great and good
men foresaw that troubulous times would arise, when rulers and
people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp
and decisive measure4 to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be
in peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the
world had taught them that what-was done in the past might be
attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States
is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
74 Kenley v. Huntington Bldg. & Loan Assn., Inc. (1934), 166 Md.
182, 170 Atl. 526.
77.Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 2, 120, 121.
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pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly
to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which
it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution,
has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve
its existence."
It required no prophetic or superhuman mind to realize
that in the years then to come there would arise temporary
emergencies creating stress and unrest among the people, but
determining in no uncertain terms that, if the nation was to live,
it must live and progress under and within the terms of a written
constitution. It is in times of emergency, stress and violence that
we need the whole strength of an unbroken constitution to save
us from destruction3 8
An economic depression is undeniably a national emergency,
and in times of national emergencies, not only is there authority,
but there is clearly a duty upon all the branches of government,
the executive, and legislative as well as upon courts of law and
equity, to use every lawful means to alleviate the stress and
tension of the resultant situation. Nevertheless, courts of law
and equity are as much bound by the Constitution as are the
other branches of government; and equity, except as is herein-
before set forth, can not and will not, interfere with the lawful
and orderly procedure of foreclosure.
71Kenley v. Huntington Bldg. & Loan Assn., Inc. (1934), 166 Md.
182, 170 Atl. 526; Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp.
(1933), 147 Misc. (N. Y.) 655, 265 N. Y. S. 125.
